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Abstract
Persistent uncertainty about the future of the Renewable Fuel Standard led to an analysis of the
policy’s language and the varying degrees of political support for the program in the Senate.
Applying probabilities to the various conceived scenarios resulted in a 40% change that the
program continues in its current form in perpetuity. The report finds that a Democratic Congress
would implement legislation that focuses on the policy’s missed environmental goals.
Conversely, a Republican Congress would lead to the most uncertainty in the market due to
competing views of the RFS within the program. With a narrow Republican majority, legislation
that limits ethanol and advances the environmental goals could be achieved as a compromise
between the two parties. As a hedge against federal regulatory uncertainty, state and local
incentives for biodiesel are considered. Las Vegas, Nevada emerges as a top destination for a
biodiesel producer.
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Introduction
The state of Iowa’s 3.16 million people may make up less than 1% of the United States of
America’s total population, but they command an outsized voice in national politics i. When Iowa
speaks, politicians must listen because the rural state is the first to hold caucuses for Presidential
elections ii. As it happens, Iowans are the country’s largest producers of corn iiiand second largest
producers of soybeans iv, a fact that keeps all Federal agriculture-related policies on the mind of
the state’s citizens.
This is the context that then-Presidential candidate and Senator Marco Rubio found
himself in when he was asked about biofuels on November 24, 2015, in Grinnell, Iowa. In the
audience was a farmer who thanked Senator Rubio for stating that he supported the Renewable
Fuel Standard until its “expiration” in 2022. Rubio responded by making his opposition to
government established portfolios clear, but quickly clarified his view that “People have gone
out and made investments based on existing laws. I think it would be unfair to yank it away in
the middle. [The RFS] should be allowed to continue until it expires [in 2022].” v
Nobody in the audience (nor in another audience where he explicitly called 2022 the
expiration of RFS) seemed to adversely react to Rubio’s choice of words. Since neither an
assembly of farmers nor a hopeful Presidential candidate recognized that the policy language
dictates a perpetual continuation of the RFS, it should come as no surprise that many in industry
seem confused about the program’s path after 2022.
Indeed, the Renewable Fuel Standard’s future is inherently mired in uncertainty due to
the white canvas the policy grants an acting EPA Administrator beginning in 2023. Floating
rumors and misguided claims throughout the industry have compounded this uncertainty.
Whether it be Senator Marco Rubio’s conversations with farmers or my own conversations with
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industry leaders, the persistence of political uncertainty made researching the Renewable Fuel
Standard an exciting venture. Throughout all of the associated research, three questions kept
manifesting themselves: 1.) What is going to happen to this legislation after 2022? 2.) Is the
Renewable Fuel Standard sufficient to incentivize the market behavior policymakers seek? and
3.) What are the various conceivable scenarios for an RFS 3.0? Everything that follows is my
best attempt at answering each of these questions.
After assessing the world of RFS as it is and the world of RFS as it likely will be, this
report aims to offer a better future for the program. The program’s goals are both important and
urgent. Predictions of what happens if nothing changes are dire, with Harvard’s James H. Stock
writing that “With an unreformed RFS and projected declines in gasoline demand, the most
plausible scenario is one of continued politicization, rising and volatile compliance costs,
increasing biodiesel imports, flat or declining domestic ethanol sales, and further stagnation of
domestic second generation technologies.” vi None of these are desired scenarios for the United
States. It is time to consider what reform should look like and how the stain of political
uncertainty can be washed away from the Renewable Fuel Standard’s future. Putting forth a
policy mechanism rooted in the goals of the program that aligns incentives with the desired
outcomes will set the program on a better path.
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Understanding the Renewable Fuel Standard
Before analyzing the uncertainty around the program’s future, the program itself must
first be understood. The Renewable Fuel Standard, which dictates that a mandatory minimum
volume of biofuels must be blended into the United States’ transportation fuel supply each year,
was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) and expanded by the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA). At its core, the Renewable Fuel Standard’s goals
are “to enhance energy security through additional domestic production of biofuels, to support
rural economies, and to promote second generation transportation fuels with low life cycle
greenhouse gas footprints.” vii The policy mechanism through which these goals are meant to be
accomplished is the mandated Renewable Volume Obligations that must be blended into the
country’s transportation fuel supply; these are increasingly ambitious annual volume targets for
the blending of biofuels. Refiners and petroleum product importers are required to either blend
biofuels into their supplies or purchase Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) to demonstrate
compliance with Renewable Volume Obligations. EPA offers the best explanation for this design
structure: “EPA calculates and establishes RVOs every year through rulemaking, based on the
CAA volume requirements and projections of gasoline and diesel production for the coming
year. The standards are converted into a percentage and obligated parties must demonstrate
compliance annually.” viii
The program works by attaching a RIN to each produced gallon of renewable fuel. The
RIN gets separated from the renewable fuel once the fuel is blended into a petroleum product.
For example, corn ethanol that demonstrates at least a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions gets awarded a D6 RIN (there are different RIN codes for different biofuels). The D6
RIN gets separated once the ethanol is blended into gasoline. Refiners must either blend biofuels
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into their petroleum products or purchase RINs in the market to meet established Renewable
Volume Obligations. This market system functions by allowing the RIN value to float enough to
encourage additional production when the market appears to be falling short of blending
mandates. At the same time, the market mechanism theoretically allows for the RIN price to
collapse when renewable fuel blending exceeds mandates. High volatility and compliance costs
in this market are a central part of reform proposals and will be addressed in detail during this
report’s reform section. The graphic below illustrates how RINs are generated, separated, and
purchased.
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In order to guide the market towards accomplishing a trio of policy goals, the EISA
designates cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, advanced biofuel, and renewable fuel as four
nested fuel categories within the program. Each of these fuels have their own compliance
benefits; i.e. some can be counted for multiple fuel types whereas some, like ethanol, can be
classified as a renewable fuel only. Central to the architecture of the nested structure is the
understanding that different biofuels fulfill different policy goals. Ethanol could be a boom for
the agricultural economy of America without producing much of an environmental benefit.
8

Cellulosic biofuels can reduce greenhouse gas emissions of our country’s energy portfolio; at the
same time, biomass-based diesel could work to solve all three policy goals depending on how
indirect land use change is accounted for. Future changes in the policy can be anticipated by
understanding which of the policy goals hold equal or greater prevalance than they did in 2007.
From here, working backwards can reveal which biofuels will receive the greatest political
support in the reform process.

RIN Code
D3
D4
D5
D6
D7

Fuel Type
Cellulosic Biofuel
Biomass-based Diesel
Advanced Biofuel
Renewable Fuel
Cellulosic Diesel

Qualifies For
Cellulosic Biofuel, Advanced Biofuel, Renewable Fuel
Biomass-based Diesel, Advanced Biofuel, Renewable Fuel
Advanced Biofuel, Renewable Fuel
Renewable Fuel
Cellulosic Biofuel, Advanced Biofuel, Renewable Fuel

GHG
Reduction
Threshold
60%
50%
50%
20%
60%

Here, it could be concluded already that the program aligns the incentives of the RINs
market with the extent to which policy goals are achieved. Conventional wisdom suggests that
EISA achieves incentive alignment by creating different classes of RINs based on differing
greenhouse gas emission reduction thresholds. This becomes a focus later in the report, but it is
worth stating here that the program only achieves this to a prohibitively low extent. Although
RINs are currently earned by reaching a greenhouse gas reduction threshold, there is no incentive
for reducing emissions beyond the threshold. Critics might suggest that awarding renewable
diesel 1.6 RINs per gallon is a way of achieving this, but here the award is once again based
solely on reaching the stated threshold. Moreover, reviewing the current literature on the
environmental impacts of ethanol production suggests the Renewable Fuel Standard may have
had no net positive environmental benefit at all.
The Renewable Fuel Standard’s exact policy language in the Energy Independence and
Security Act stops dictating specific Renewable Volume Obligations after 2022. This part of the
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policy sits at the core of industry’s uncertainty about what the program will look like in 2023 and
beyond. In fact, many industry participants even have (or have had) the mistaken belief that the
program reaches its sunset in 2022. David Cox, General Counsel for the Renewable Natural Gas
Coalition, wrote publicly of the dangers of misinformation in the market about RFS: “Every day,
fuel procurement, project financing and infrastructure investment decisions are heavily
influenced by misinformation… Harmful reports of a 2022 RFS expiration persist.” ix
Conversations with industry participants – those who trade the fuel, those who produce those
fuel, and especially those who procure the feedstock – confirmed the pervasiveness of
misinformation. This, of course, is easy to clarify: The Renewable Fuel Standard does not sunset
in 2022.
What proves much harder to clear up is persistent uncertainty about what a perpetual
continuation really looks like. This results from the fact that the policy reads as if it was written
by somebody intending to be vague, stating that “the purposes of subparagraph (A), the
applicable volumes of each fuel specified in the tables in clause (i) for calendar years after the
calendar years specified in the tables shall be determined by the Administrator, in coordination
with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Agriculture.” x These unelected officials (each
is an appointed position) are not allowed to pull numbers out of thin air and deem them the
Renewable Volume Obligations, however. The Administrator cannot legally remove the program
from existence without legitimate cause, even though the EPA’s website mentions that “the
statute also contains a general waiver authority that allows the Administrator to waive the RFS
volumes, in whole or in part, based on a determination that implementation of the program is
causing severe economic or environmental harm.” xi This “waiver authority” compounds market
uncertainty for years beyond 2022 and gives the appearance that the political leanings of an
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administrator could dictate policy. However, the policy dictates that the EPA Administrator’s
rulemaking be grounded in a fairly specific process.
The Administrator’s RVO rulemaking must be based on “a review of the implementation
of the program during calendar years specified in the tables.” xii In other words, the previous
years with mandated volumes must, by law, be instructive in setting annual volume obligations.
The second component of what the EPA Administrator must do in determining annual volume
obligations is analyze six different factors: how renewable fuels will impact the environment;
how renewable fuels will impact the country’s energy security; expected production rates of
renewable fuels in the future; how renewable fuels will impact infrastructure in the United States
and how compatible infrastructure in the United States is with renewable fuels; how renewable
fuels will impact consumers at the pump; and how renewable fuels will effect rural and
agricultural economies. The Renewable Fuel Standard’s original goals of energy security,
environmental protection, and rural economic support are at the core of what the Administrator
must consider in setting Renewable Volume Obligations. These three pillars are the goals that
will be evaluated to determine what the future must be based on.
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There are a few further limitations imposed by the law, such as requiring all biomassbased diesel volumes never slipping below 1 billion gallons (the amount set for 2012, the last
year with specific biomass-based diesel mandates). While a floor exists for biomass-based diesel,
a ceiling exists for corn ethanol and other conventional biofuels: 15 billion gallons per year
(illustrated in the chart below xiii). As for timing, the Administrator is required to announce RVOs
at least 14 months in advance of the applicable period for biomass-based diesel. Assuming this
rule is followed, this should impose at least some limit on RIN market volatility (addressed later)
as transparency in 2021 and 2022 can lead to efficient trading in 2023.

Table 1 Weaver Presentation: How Do RINs Work?

The set-up in its current forms still allows for a fair degree of speculation as to how EPA
will approach RFS for years beyond those with specific mandates. In its current form, the
Renewable Fuel Standard requires EPA to evaluate the program’s goals and set renewable
volume obligations in a manner conducive to achieving those goals in the future, as informed by
the understanding of the program’s history. Determining, then, if the RFS achieved its goals (and
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whether these goals are still relevant) is of preeminent importance. Any understanding of what
Renewable Volume Obligations will look like hinges upon how the Administrator assesses the
six analytical pillars outlined in the policy. To emulate this process, the program’s success
against its three main goals is weighed to consider how an apolitical EPA Administrator would
act. Forecasting the policy priorities and political leanings of a specific EPA Administrator fell
beyond the scope of this report. This is not to say that the perception of RFS’s goal attainment
will not vary by who sits at the helm of the EPA. Rather, it is meant to be an apolitical
assessment of the RFS’s ability to achieve its goals since inception. Adjustments to the analysis
can be made after obtaining future clarity about who the future administrator will be.
In addition to allowing entry into the thought process of any acting administrator, such an
analysis will also lead to policy recommendations for any RFS re-write. Many industry
participants and RFS Stakeholders mentioned that Congress would probably act in 2023 (the
optimistic among those interviewed did not assign a timeframe) to rewrite RFS to avoid leaving
complete control of the program to the Executive Branch. Understanding what this rewrite could
look like requires formulating a view on the program’s ability to obtain its goals and on how
Congress will act in different scenarios. Analyzing the Senate vote-by-vote, which is taken as a
proxy for the Congressional composition as a whole, informs what the complicated politics of
RFS indicate is most likely to occur.
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The Patina of Success
Many politicians and industry participants are quick to point to the program’s successes, even as
others look at the program as a “flop.” Former Montana Senator Jim Talent is among the
advocates, arguing in August 2018 that “The RFS has achieved its objectives; in fact, it may be
the one federal energy policy which actually has worked.” xiv Irrespective of which goals were or
were not satisfied, there can be no denying that the Renewable Fuel Standard dramatically
accelerated the growth of renewable
fuels production. The Energy
Information Administration (EIA)
releases data on the monthly
production of biofuels (measured in
trillions of British Thermal Units)
in the United States. This data
demonstrates that biofuel production only experienced the bulk of its exponential growth after
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, as shown
above. As far as the increasing the production of biofuels is concerned, the Renewable Fuel
Standard looks like a resounding success.
This growth should not come as a surprise as it is not rooted in magical leaps in
technology but in fundamental economic theory. Conventional economic wisdom holds that
when price increases supply should also increase. If a good’s value jumps, producers of the good
will likely be able to produce more of the good. Why should corn ethanol or biomass-based
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diesel be any different? The chart to
the right illustrates this realityxv.
Adding the value of RINs to a
biofuel necessarily makes it more
economical to produce, as they
dictate a new mandated point on the
demand curve. The RIN value
should, in theory, bridge the gap
between the supply and demand

Figure 1 Sourced from Farm Doc Daily: RIN Economics

points resulting from a mandate. Point QME, where the large gap in price between the forced
quantity demanded and quantity supplied is compensated for by the RIN value, illustrates this
point. It should come as no shock, then, that biofuels production increased since the program’s
inception.
Regardless of whether the growth is a result of the added value created by RINs or from
an advancement of technology, the scorecard of growth in renewable fuels in the aggregate reads
favorably for the Renewable Fuel Standard program. President of the Renewable Fuels
Association Bob Dinneen wrote to U.S. News using this exact scorecard as proof that “The RFS
has been a resounding success in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, decreasing U.S.
dependence on foreign oil and providing consumers with a cleaner, higher-performing alternative
at the pump.” xvi Of course, increased domestic production of biofuels does reduce foreign oil
imports and, depending on which carbon accounting method is used, decrease greenhouse gas
emissions. Numerous confounding variables, such as ethanol replacing MTBE as gasoline’s
primary oxygenate additive xvii, exist that offer an alternative explanation for the remarkable
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growth of biofuels production over the last decade. Using growth in biofuels as the sole metric of
success is akin to assessing a quarterback’s performance solely on the amount of passing yards
he throws for in a game.
Critics differ with Dinneen not on the scorecard of aggregate renewable fuels production
but with the growth’s causation and the lack of growth within portions of the program’s nested
structure. Examining each of the program’s goals to evaluate performance of the Renewable Fuel
Standard will paint a better picture of how an acting EPA Administrator might rationally
determine RVO in 2023 after evaluating prior years’ performance against goals. The nested
structure of the program complicates the evaluation process, thereby making an assessment of
the performance of policy goals the most efficient means of evaluating the program at large. By
choosing to settle on a myopic assessment of the Renewable Fuel Standard’s performance,
policymakers would misplace incentives and direct the market in a direction that runs counter to
the policy’s actual goals. This is not a mistake the United States can afford to make;
consequently, the performance of the program against each of its goals must be fully examined.
Policy Goal 1: Increase Energy Security
The twin oil price shocks of the 1970’s coupled with concerns of Peak Oil Theory
imbued fears of energy insecurity into the psyche of American citizens. Long lines and higher
prices at the pump coupled with an increased portion of the country’s energy supplies coming
from nations that are hostile to our own amplified these fears. In line with this mentality,
President George W. Bush warned of America’s oil addiction in his 2006 State of the Union
Address xviii. President Barack Obama, standing on the opposite end of the political spectrum as
Bush, also spoke about energy security concerns in considerable depth during a speech at
Georgetown University in 2011, saying “the situation in the Middle East implicates our energy
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security. xix” The parallel in quotes from two ideologically opposed administrations underscores
the bipartisan nature of energy security concerns. It logically follows that the Renewable Fuel
Standard requires the EPA Administrator to assess impacts on energy security when formulating
future Renewable Volume Obligations. This calculus changes if the relevance of energy security
as a national issue underwent a paradigmatic shift since the Bush and Obama days.
Defining energy security is itself a difficult task, especially as the world becomes
increasingly interconnected. The International Energy Agency attempts to define the term as
meaning “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price. xx” Based on this
definition, both price and accessibility are variables that must be considered in an assessment of
the Renewable Fuel Standard’s aim to increase energy security. Does this mean the program
should be judged on how low oil prices have fallen since inception? What is an “affordable”
price? For whom must the price be affordable? Entire books are written on the inherent volatility
of crude oil prices, a reality of market fundamentals that render price an unfair judge of the
program’s success.
The IEA’s usage of the term “uninterrupted availability” better lends itself to
quantitatively analyzing energy security. Perhaps the best proxy for assessing energy security,
then, is the Energy Information Administration’s petroleum import data. After all, the only way
to ensure an uninterrupted supply of energy is sourcing it from within the country’s borders.
Comparing the increase in ethanol production since the inception of the Renewable Fuel
Standard against the change in petroleum imports over the same time period will reveal to what
extent the program increased energy security.
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Looking at the data suggests that growth in ethanol production helped bring down total
crude oil and petroleum products
imports. Shown graphically,
right, imports have enjoyed
consistent annual declines since
the debut of the Renewable Fuel
Standard. The relationship
between the two holds up
mathematically as well: the
correlation coefficient between
the two data sets comes in at .8577. At this point, skepticism should pour in. How could ethanol, whose 2011 to 2012 yearover-year growth is just 16,000 kb, be responsible for a 295,000 kb decline in total oil and
products imports? Even though the correlation looks strong, causation does not logically follow
due to the order of magnitude difference in annual changes for the two data series. One ethanol
barrel cannot displace 10 oil barrels.
As a result of this mismatch in orders of magnitude, the Renewable Fuel Standard cannot
be concluded as being responsible for
the strengthening of energy security, or
at least not for 90% of the decline in

Data Sets Analysis
Correlation Between Imports, Crude
Production
Correlation Between Imports,
Ethanol

-0.8819
-0.8578

imports since the program’s inception. Recent breakthroughs in the domestic extraction of
hydrocarbons from shale rock through a combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal
drilling distort any study of how the Renewable Fuel Standard impacted energy security. These
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breakthroughs and the associated resurgence in U.S. petroleum extraction are far more
responsible for making our energy supply more secure than the Renewable Fuel Standard. This,
too, holds up mathematically with a -.8819 correlation coefficient between crude oil production
and petroleum imports. There is also alignment in the respective orders of magnitude.
Of the many consequences of the United States’ newfound ability to extract vast
quantities of oil and natural gas, the diminishing weight of energy security concerns in policy
discussions holds particular importance here. Senators from states indifferent to farming incomes
and skeptical of climate change could at least potentially be swayed to cast a vote in favor of the
Renewable Fuel Standard due to energy security concerns in the past. The aforementioned
former Senator Jim Talent falls into precisely this category, having launched Americans for
Energy Security and Innovation, which will “focus its efforts on building support for a stronger
RFS to reduce our dependence on foreign oil from unfriendly nations.” xxi Now, however, this
policy concern stands largely addressed by a market development that occurred totally
independent of the program. Adversarial oil-producing behemoths no longer necessitate the
energy security goal of the Renewable Fuel Standard.
The policy goal attainment looking like a resounding success story of the Renewable Fuel
Standard to only be uprooted by the analysis of a confounding variable is par for the course with
the Renewable Fuel Standard. Later, the reduction in U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions will
follow this same pattern. Understanding the real drivers of policy goal attainment (or, failure)
leads to the final conclusion that an impartial administrator will focus on setting goals that
continue to advance rural incomes and decrease greenhouse gas emissions.
Taking a cue from the rhetoric of current Energy Secretary Rick Perry would completely
remove the energy security goal from the policy language of the RFS, “An energy dominant
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America will export to markets around the world, increasing our global leadership and our
influence.” xxii Indeed, Secretary Perry and the Administration at large are focused on energy
dominance, not energy security, manifesting that the energy security policy goal was
accomplished almost by accident by something that runs counterintuitively to the RFS. As such,
any new version of RFS will have to be focused on the other two main goals, to the extent that
they each remain relevant. The diminishing concern about energy security requires that any new
RFS be rooted in either advancing rural economies or achieving GHG reductions.
Policy Goal 2: Advance Rural Economies and Farm Incomes
The policy’s goal to assist the nation’s farmers through price support brought on by increased
demand can be evaluated in a multitude of ways. For the purposes of this paper, farm incomes
are seen as the best evaluative tool as this is the actual amount of income earned by farmers in
rural America. To be truly conclusive, using net lift to farm incomes by deploying models that
backed out probable crop prices without the Renewable Fuel Standard would be required. As
this falls outside the boundaries of what this paper seeks to accomplish, data from the USDA is
utilized as a proxy.
Here, net farm incomes are seen as declining ever since 2013, suggesting that the RFS
needs to continue in order to achieve the rural income goal. There should still be no denying that
the Renewable Fuel Standard assisted farmers since its inception as the core of the program
involves increasing demand for corn and soybean oil. Imagine, for a moment, just how steep the
decline in incomes would have been without the RFS. Conventional economic wisdom dictates
that increased demand leads to increased prices. To confirm the value of the RFS to rural
America, Iowa State University (ISU) researchers developed tractable multi-market equilibrium
models that reached a conclusion that the program does indeed support the agricultural economy.
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The study estimates a corn price without RFS and with 2022 mandates of $2.75/bu and $3.88/bu,
respectively. The study runs the same analysis for soybean oil and arrives at a price of 21.17
cents per pound without RFS and 27.81 cents per pound based on a 2022 mandate estimate xxiii.
According to this analysis farmers would receive 23-29% less revenue for their crops without the
RFS mandates!
Farmers themselves are among the loudest proponents of the program, as evidenced by
the National Corn Growers Association’s
comment that states “Rural America
supported President Trump last year, now
we need the President to support rural
America. Supporting policy changes that
undermine the RFS will hurt farmers,
renewable fuel plant workers, and rural
America.” xxiv This quote and ISU study
highlight the importance of the RFS to farmers by showing how much price support the RFS
provides to agriculture markets. As such, the policy goal of providing support to rural America
and the agriculture industry was certainly achieved by the RFS, as it theoretically should, given
the demand mandates. Whether more support is or is not needed to maintain the livelihoods of
these groups and communities cannot be inferred from the previously mentioned data.
Nonetheless, the agriculture industry – whose voice rings loudly in Washington – certainly
claims that continued or greater support is indeed needed to placate farmers in America.
This goal will necessarily be a key focus of the Administrator in 2023. If the Trump
Administration still holds power, this goal will be ever-so central to the RFS as the
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Administration has had to place major Band-Aids on the trade war wounds of rural America
through innovative vehicles such as a $12 billion aid package xxv. The Administration needs to
maintain its political capital with farm states following the trade war’s consequences and the
RFS is one area that can deliver the relief the agriculture community craves.
In many of my phone calls with former EPA officials and industry participants the future
of biomass-based diesel was debated. For example, in an RFS re-write, an olive branch could be
extended to big oil where biomass-based diesel targets would be removed (or at least relaxed)
from the policy language and ethanol targets remain.
This report holds a view that such a compromise is fundamentally at odds with what will
be politically required of any elected officials in 2023 and beyond. Asides from being an
egregious move away from the policy’s environmental goals, such a compromise would hurt
some of the nation’s most vulnerable farmers. Soy farmers in America already ailing from the
Chinese Trade War would be further damaged by removing biomass-based diesel targets from
the Renewable Fuel Standard. Plus, soy cannot be so easily dismissed as it was reported that it
would surpass corn in amount of domestic acreage in March 2018 for the first time in 35
years xxvi. Recently, a Bloomberg report deepened the market-forced marriage between politicians
and the agriculture community by concluding that “If history is any guide, the trade war with
China will have lasting affects for U.S. farmers and their soybean crops that the president won’t
be boasting about.” xxvii
Farmers have been vocal in stating their concerns over recent evolutions in the RFS such
as the rise in small refinery exemptions under former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt. Purdue
University economist Wallace Tyner summarized rural America’s worries by saying that farmers
“thought they were voting for an administration that was supportive of rural America.” xxviii This
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may seem to simply be another manifestation of American’s evolved relationship with
government, one Michael Lewis covers in The Fifth Risk through a quote from a former NOAA
leader who said that “The sense of identity as Citizen has been replaced by Consumer. The idea
that government should serve the citizens like a waiter or concierge, rather than in a collective
good sense.” What makes this case more pressing than just reflecting this evolution is that
farmers’ perceptions of how the Federal government handled the Renewable Fuel Standard will
be crucial in deciding who wins control of the White House in future elections.
States that flipped from voting for the Democratic Presidential Candidate in 2012 to nowPresident Donald Trump in 2016 are shaded in the darker red with diagonal lines running
through it in the map on the right of the below graphic. The fact that these states align neatly
with the states who are decidedly pro-RFS in the attached Senate analysis spells trouble for any
President trying to win reelection without supporting rural economies. Analyzing Senate
support for the RFS and aligning it with the Electoral College map limits Congress’s ability
to make meaningful downward revisions to the policy, as any political party seen as being
hostile to the interests of the agriculture community could quickly have the Electoral
College map flipped against them.
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Figure 2 Chart on Left Built from Senate Analysis

All this serves to shed light on the future of RFS: farmers will continue to receive the aid
they desire. Outright continuation of the RFS in at least some form is almost guaranteed,
irrespective of how Congress does or does not act to rewrite the legislation. That is the reality of
the politics. Politically important states on the above graphic are the same states that need the
Renewable Fuel Standard the most. Consequently, it seems likely that support for ethanol at 15
billion gallons a year will remain, as should the floor for biomass-based diesel of 1 billion
gallons. If any major change should come to biomass-based diesel as a result of rural income
concerns, it will be an upward revision as opposed to an outright elimination.
Still, ethanol is the most at-risk of being axed from any future Renewable Future
Standard as it is widely believed that the fuel’s oxygenate blending properties can shield it from
any demand loss in the event of mandates being erased. University of Illinois Economist Scott
Erwin echoes this view, arguing that “If the law changed tomorrow and gasoline companies were
free to ignore ethanol, they'd almost certainly keep right on blending ethanol into their fuel.” xxix
In a compromise between the agriculture and petroleum lobbies, ethanol could be accounted for
through some other policy mechanism outside the RFS while biomass-based diesel mandates live
on.
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As such, any compromise to appease farmers accustomed to the added crop value
provided by RINs would have to rely heavily on providing support to the biodiesel market rather
than the ethanol market. Farmers might want incentives across the board, but achieving the other
goals of the Renewable Fuel Standard requires a transition away from ethanol.

Program Failures and Policy Goal #3
Despite the astronomical growth of biofuels following the implementation of the
Renewable Fuel Standard, critics have reason to be skeptical of the Renewable Fuel Standard
success narrative put forth by Dinneen and Talent. Among the critiques is the refrain that the
outsized majority of the growth comes from corn ethanol, a fuel that satisfies the RFS goal of
supporting rural economies but at an uncertain cost to the environment xxx. Any potential claim
that the RFS succeeded in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a meaningful quantity was
uprooted by the National Climate Assessment’s recent conclusion that “Without substantial and
sustained global mitigation and regional adaptation efforts, climate change is expected to cause
growing losses to American infrastructure and property and impede the rate of economic growth
over this century.” xxxi
On top of that, the growth in cellulosic biofuels would not even appear on the same linear
scale as ethanol growth in a chart with a single Y-Axis. It was only after the EPA allowed for
Renewable Natural Gas from biomass to qualify as an approved pathway that any noticeable
cellulosic fuel growth materialized. If the program was created, in part, to transition away from
fuels that create GHGs and limit the use of food-competing fuels, critics use the below analysis
to call the program a failure.
Even as the United States decreased greenhouse gas emissions in the aggregate, the
Renewable Fuel Standard is not currently applauded by environmental groups. This results from

25

the fact that declines in the power sector are the reason for the recent decline in the country’s
GHG reductions. In fact, in late 2017, as the power sector benefited from the displacement of
coal generation with cleaner-burning natural gas xxxii, transportation replaced the power sector as
being the largest greenhouse gas emitting sector of the economy. This is the complete opposite of
what the RFS was designed to achieve. Looking at a chart of greenhouse gas emissions from
gasoline consumption versus coal reveals that it is the increasingly declining coal emissions
coming down that is largely responsible for the United States reducing its overall carbon
footprint since 2006. Gasoline emissions, however, were hardly reduced.
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The Renewable Fuel Standard hardly resulted in any tangible benefit to the environment,
then, especially when considering that the accounting merits of ethanol lifecycle emissions are
still debated and other environmental concerns have been raised. Former California
Congressman Henry Waxman tore into the environmental side of the Renewable Fuel Standard,
stating that “I supported the admirable environmental goals of the RFS when we created it 10
years ago. Now, it’s clear that the RFS has been a net-negative for the environment. Not only has
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the RFS failed to spur significant development of truly advanced fuels, but conventional biofuels
like corn ethanol and soy biodiesel are destroying wildlife habitat at home and abroad, polluting
waterways, and increasing global warming pollution.” xxxiii
Dispelling the narrative that the Renewable Fuel Standard has been an unflinching
success requires looking no further than the actual production of fuels other than ethanol. The
original mandate for 2017 advanced cellulosic fuel production was 5.5 billion gallons; yet, just
10 million gallons were produced. The technology that was supposed to come is still stuck in
traffic. Fuels that were supposed to deliver the greenhouse gas emission reductions did not come,
even as ethanol production took off. Compounding the environmental woes of repeated mandates
misses is the fact that “between 2008 and 2012, farmers plowed under more than 7 million acres
of habitat, mostly to plant corn and soy. That led to the release of carbon pollution equivalent to
the annual emissions of 20 million additional cars on the road,” as written by David DeGennaro
of the National Wildlife Federation xxxiv. This speaks to former Congressman Waxman’s view
that the RFS not only failed to help the environment, but hurt it in the process of seeking the
advancement of rural incomes.
The list of environmental problems associated with the Renewable Fuel Standard runs on,
with the Competitive Enterprise Institute recently writing that: “There is
considerable evidence (including a recent report from EPA itself) that pristine grasslands,
especially in the upper Midwest, have been converted to grow corn used to make ethanol.” xxxv
And yet, the program marches on, undisturbed. At the same time as it fails to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions in the way the program originally set out to, the Renewable Fuel Standard appears
to be causing myriad environmental damages while the other policy goals are pursued with force.
Curbing these issues and properly incentivizing reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are
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crucial pillars to allow any foundation of a future Renewable Fuel Standard to stand on solid
environmental ground. The original environmental goals are both unachieved and still relevant,
demanding they be a central consideration in any future change to the program.
Now a cliché, Einstein’s original articulation that labeled insanity “doing the same thing
over and over and expecting different results” applies to the environmental goal of the
Renewable Fuel Standard over time. Hoping the Renewable Fuel Standard will guide the market
to a promised land of clean, renewable fuels requires faith -- belief without evidence – because
the facts suggest it simply has not worked. As such, either a greater incentive or completely
reimagined RFS will be required to deliver on the environmental goals of the legislation. Rep.
Peter Welch and Senator Tom Udall introduced bills into the house and senate in March 2018
that would phase out the ethanol mandate and introduce an incentive to protect land from being
used in agriculture production. Though this bill is not seen as likely to pass, the appetite among
Congressmen to revise the RFS in order to ensure its environmental goals are reached speaks
volumes about the future of the legislation. What, specifically, reform will look like given the
lack of environmental improvements created by RFS 2.0 is the focus of the remainder of the
report.

What Reform Can and Should Be
There are many competing thoughts on what reform of the Renewable Fuel Standard
should look like, and the politics of the legislation are extraordinarily complicated. The analysis
of policy goals in this report suggests that reform requires increasing incentives for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions from transportation fuels, maintaining some level of support for rural
economies, and rethinking the ethanol mandate. In an ideal world, Congress should construct a
program that mandates biodiesel, renewable diesel, and advance biofuels blending without any
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regard for ethanol blending. Ethanol demand already derives support from its aforementioned
benefits as an octane enhancer in gasoline. Mandating its blending is akin to creating a law that
rewards humans for consuming calories. If a behavior would happen without the presence of a
policy, why subsidize it?
To increase the odds of passing legislation that satisfies enough interested parties, an RFS
3.0 is devised below that features two classes of RINs, one for ethanol (with the caveat that an
ethanol phase-out should be instituted so long as the voting structure of Congress allows it to
pass) and one for all other biofuels. In the reimagined RIN awarding process, all fuels are
assessed based on their greenhouse gas emission reductions and measured against the same
metric for ethanol in the RIN awarding process. The greater the lifecycle GHG emissions
reduction against ethanol, the greater the reward. Here, the actual desired outcome -- greenhouse
gas emission declines -- is properly incentivized. Awarding RINs based on the achieved
emissions reduction against ethanol ensures the market will transition to more environmentallyfriendly fuels. At the same time, maintaining the incentive for biomass-based diesel will continue
to lend support to rural economies.
One of the common arguments from Senators is that the nature of RIN trading needs to
be changed due to high compliance costs and unpredictable costs created by the volatility of the
RINs market. In some circles, capping the RIN price is synonymous with Renewable Fuel
Standard reform. Texas Senator Ted Cruz stands at the center of this circle with a constant
request for a 10 cent price cap on RINs xxxvi. It is worth noting, however, that any artificial cap
on RINs prices is not viewed as a feasible solution to the challenges the Renewable Fuel
Standard faces. Real reform requires moving beyond a price cap and restructuring the program to
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more closely align with its policy goals. Doing this satisfies those wanting more predictable
compliance costs by removing layers of political uncertainty, as discussed below.
Capping the cost of compliance would distort market signals and impede the policy’s
abilities to achieve its goals; if compliance is not occurring, prices have to respond accordingly.
Though it may be politically popular in petroleum products-producing states, a cap would hurt
the very farmers that politicians now have to try desperately to help amid a trade war that has
hurt rural America. This is not to say that reform should not include any adjustment to the
market’s overall structure; any market structure not achieving its policy goals should not be left
to its own devices in perpetuity. Rather, it is the actual cause of missed policy goals that must be
handled.
The real problem with RIN price volatility is not that prices are allowed to float freely but
that the administrative body often sends distorted signals to the market and the price is not
indexed to the extent to which any individual RIN achieves policy goals. One day, the
administration waives small refineries from needing to comply with the Renewable Fuel
Standard; the next, the President will speak on the need to permit year-round sales of E15 (a
gasoline blend containing 15% ethanol). This flip-flopping in the political approach to renewable
fuels disrupts the market’s functioning. To address the former of these issues, maintaining
transparency and limiting political threats should be the priority of political leaders once reform
passes. Distorting an already complicated market with price controls would only deepen the
problems with the program as changes in Washington leadership could cause a reversion to a
fully free market, and hence increased volatility around added political uncertainty. Limiting the
economic value obtainable from a RIN would also prohibit the program from achieving its own
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goals as markets would not be able to adjust to incentivize the marginal gallon of renewable fuel
to be produced.
Adding price controls to the market would be akin to fighting fire with fire. Increasing
the government’s presence in the market would lead to increased potential for volatility over
time. Government’s role in the RFS should be setting mandates, ensuring compliance, and
providing clear signals about what type of market behavior is desired. Obscuring these signals,
managing prices, and adding layers of uncertainty hamstring the Renewable Fuel Standard’s
potential.
With this in mind, the Renewable Fuel Standard’s future is often painted as one that
should either be the same as it is today or completely eradicated. If two of the three policy goals
have not changed, there should be no reason that the debate need be so binary. Neither a
perpetual continuation nor an outright kill bill should be the proposed solution: calculated reform
should be the answer. One school of thought for reform was previously mentioned as protecting
lands; though important, such an amendment is more of a supplement to full RFS reform than it
is constitutive of reform in and of itself. Land protect is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
of an RFS 3.0. Reform requires reimagining how RINs are awarded and aligning the entire RIN
generating process with the policy’s goals.
In order to generate a RIN in the program’s current form, biomass-based diesel must
meet a 50% lifecycle GHG reduction, cellulosic biofuel must meet a 60% reduction, advanced
biofuel from biomass (other than corn starch) must meet a 50% GHG reduction, and
conventional renewable fuel – usually, ethanol – must meet a 20% lifecycle GHG reduction
threshold. What’s lost in all this is a reward for reductions that exceed the thresholds; currently,
producers of renewable fuels have no economic incentive under the Renewable Fuel Standard to
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reduce GHG emissions in excess of the stated requirements for each fuel. Fixing this
misalignment should take center stage in the reform process, especially given that the
environmental goals of the program appear to be the furthest from complete of all the program’s
policy goals.
After contemplating various reform proposals, I created a high-level organization of the
RFS that would align the incentive structure more closely with the program’s goals. In this
structure, two classes of RINs would exist: one that gets awarded to all “renewable” fuel
production and a second from renewable fuels that achieve greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs)
reductions in excess of conventional ethanol. RIN1, in this sense, could be limited to 15 billion
gallons per year, thereby artificially limiting the price volatility of RIN1 as it would not qualify
for RIN2 and therefore not be subject to volatile political changes. RIN2 quantity requirements,
however, would be assigned an annual mandate based on the desired reduction in the amount of
greenhouse gas emissions of the United States’ overall transportation fuel mix. The existence of
RIN1 is solely to ensure a relatively high possibility of passing legislation that included these
elements.
In order to generate any RIN2’s a renewable fuels producer would be required to
demonstrate a proven reduction in greenhouse gas emissions against a conventional ethanol
baseline in the same way that current greenhouse gas thresholds are evaluated at EPA under RFS
2.0. In this program, the amount of RINs awarded aligns directly with the amount of greenhouse
gas reductions achieved by the fuel. Somebody who achieves a 40% reduction in a fuel’s GHG
reductions would receive twice as many RIN2’s as a producer who achieves a 20% reduction.
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RIN1 is proposed only
to earn the Congressional
votes of ethanol-producing
states; to fully move the
program into the new realities
of the market, the ethanol
mandate would have to have a
sunset provision. Analyzing
the Senate make-up suggests
that excluding any ethanol
mandate would sacrifice up to 14 Senate votes whose support for RFS was identified as being
contingent upon the ethanol mandate. This would send RFS support well below the majority,
even when counting all remaining “Maybe” votes as “Yes” votes. The inclusion of ethanol also
satisfies the advancing rural economies goal of the original legislation. It will ultimately be the
policymakers who decide the fate of the ethanol mandate; the fractured views on the subject
could result in the killing of the mandate with a compromise for the introduction of some other
policy mechanism to support ethanol demand.
Congress establishing desired national GHGs reduction targets for transportation fuels at
the program’s inception would limit volatility induced by the EPA rulemaking process each year.
Parties desiring a cap on ethanol RIN prices would be dually satisfied as RINs generated from
ethanol production would be capped at the current upper limit of 15 billion gallons per year.
With an artificial supply limitation, the volatility associated with RIN1 prices would be
suppressed as ethanol is already generated in large quantities to be utilized as a gasoline additive
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for performance characteristics. With time, Congress could even wind down this portion of the
“ideal” Renewable Fuel Standard to award only the fuels that achieve a clear environmental
benefit against ethanol.
The most important distinguishing factor of this “ideal RFS Reform” is that it neatly
aligns the market reward with the extent to which a fuel meets a specific policy goal. In former
Speaker of the House Paul Ryan’s book The Way Forward, he writes “if you tax something, you
get less of it.” The flipside of this relationship is that if the United States demands more of
something, it must pay for it. Rewarding each additional percentage reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions will better incentivize investment in clean, renewable fuels. Assigning annual RIN2
mandates based on percentage reductions in greenhouse gas emissions would also tie the
theoretical value of a RIN with its value towards achieving a policy goal. Incentivizing
renewable fuels production of any kind mistakes the means for the end. The end goal is not
production growth; rather, production growth is a means to the end goals of advancing rural
economies and reducing the environmental impacts of the transportation sector.
The first two goals – advancing energy security and supporting rural incomes – are also
achieved herein as any gallon of a domestically produced renewable fuel continues to be a gallon
of fuel not imported from potential adversaries and the RIN1 price could serve to maintain rural
incomes from farming. Additionally, biomass-based diesel must already meet a GHG reduction
that is larger than the reduction required of ethanol so the RIN2s generated by soy-based
biodiesel would further compensate farmers. Other policy mechanisms would need to be
designed should Congress wish to wind down the ethanol mandate with time and still desire
some form of market assistance for rural economies. At its core, this version of the Renewable
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Fuel Standard would shift the quantity of a good desired from renewable fuels to reduced
greenhouse gas emissions from renewable fuels.
RFS 3.0, as described above, is in line with the policy’s original goals and informed by
evolutions in goal attainment of the policy over time. It also reflects a level-headed assessment of
confounding variables that have distorted the extent to which other goals are still needed: ethanol
as an oxygenate has firmed demand for the fuel independent of the RFS; rapid increases in
domestic production of fossil fuels have transformed energy independence; and the power
sector’s shift to natural gas has been the real driver of declining U.S. GHG reductions.
Transparent, firm, and Congressionally-passed annual GHG reduction mandates will give the
market the clarity and incentive needed to encourage long-term investment in “next generation”
renewable fuels.
California’s LCFS follows a similar structure as the federal program proposed above.
“The LCFS requires producers of petroleum-based fuels to reduce the carbon intensity of their
products, beginning with a quarter of a percent in 2011 culminating in a 10 percent total
reduction in 2020.” xxxvii The program administers compliance by requiring carbon producers
such as refiners to either develop their own low CI fuels or purchase LCFS credits from those
who do. Indexing credit values to the quantity of the reduction in carbon intensity is an idea
borrowed from LCFS and one that works with proven success. Even with a few complications
along its path, the success of the LCFS is well-documented, with an Executive Vice President of
the Renewable Fuels Association recently saying “It seems like there’s less risk that something
could go wrong with the LCFS, whereas with the RFS, gosh—it seems like every day we’ve got
a new headline coming out about some new clandestine, secret effort to undermine the
RFS.” xxxviii
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In James Stock’s “Reforming the Renewable Fuel Standard” paper for Columbia
University’s SIPA School, he concludes that two of three key legislative reforms of the RFS are
to “reduce sharply the compliance costs of blending ethanol into E10. This component builds on
the recognition that ethanol has become the cost-effective choice for octane enhancement” and to
“transform the second-generation part of the RFS into a technology-pushing program that
provides reliable, effective, and long-term support for nascent low-GHG renewable fuels,
regardless of feedstock.” xxxix Both of these goals are central to the RFS 3.0 designed above: by
attaching RIN generation to the value of GHG reductions, advanced technology is properly
incentivized by matching the value of the incentive received to every incremental achievement in
greenhouse gas reductions.
Compliance costs of blending ethanol also would theoretically come down as the ethanol
RIN price should adjust to reflect the needed value based on supply and demand fundamentals of
the market. If supply of ethanol overwhelms demand of RIN1s because of ethanol production
occurring as a result of octane enhancement demand, the price of RIN1s should drop to a level
that matches the needed subsidy. With time (and with a Congress that has the political ability to
withdraw it) the RIN1 could be completely phased out and only greenhouse gas emissions in
excess of ethanol’s reductions would be rewarded.
Stock also pinpoints “the small markets for E15 and E85” as a culprit for why volatility
in the RINs market is so high; additionally, he highlights that “RIN prices are sensitive to rumors
and market guesses.” Both of these principal concerns are removed by reducing the significance
of ethanol in the RFS 3.0 and through establish emission reduction goals at the program’s
inception. All uncertainty associated with the rulemaking process would be eluded through the
creation of concrete mandates for annual reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Even though
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the principal aim of RFS 3.0 would be to better satisfy the missed policy goal of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, it also lends support to rural economies and continues to increase the
domestic production of renewable fuels.

What Will Actually Occur: Politics, Politics, Politics
The reality of the Senate’s current make-up dictates that a reconfiguration of the program
in 2023 in line with the ideal version outlined above is impossible absent an ideological shift in
the Senate’s composition. Analyzing each individual Senator’s political comments and voting
history on RFS-related matters (where available) as of November 1, 2018 reveals that if the
Renewable Fuel Standard went through a vote in the Senate tomorrow, 54 Senators would vote
yes, 5 could be made to vote yes if certain compromises are made, and 41 are perceived as voting
against the Renewable Fuel Standard. Multiple “yes” votes are hinged on strong support for the
rural income portion of the policy that assists farmers through mandated ethanol demand.
Enough Senators place a hardline on the ethanol mandate that a pure removal of it from the
policy would require serious compromise in other areas.
Looking at each vote in the Senate individually gives a sense of what any “RFS 3.0”
would look like; such an analysis was necessary as multiple key contacts stated in phone
interviews that the program will continue as written through 2023, after which the Senate will act
to wrestle the power to determine mandates away from the EPA Administrator by writing new
mandates and perhaps a new program entirely.
Prior to analyzing how the assumed Congressional composition would vote (it is assumed
that any RFS that passes through the Senate would duly pass through the House), it is worth
stating what will occur to the Renewable Fuel Standard in the event that no legislative change
occurs. This scenario is given a 40% probability of occurring as it is assumed 100% likely that a
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Democratic-controlled Congress would move to introduce an RFS 3.0, thus no probability is
attributed to “No Legislative Change” in a Democratic Congress. The odds of a Democratic
Senate are assumed to be 20%, the odds provided by FiveThirtyEight’s analysis of the 2018
Senate election xl. Extrapolating this forward through two elections – 2020 and 2022 – is a rough
assumption to make but is the best available probability as of now. In the Republican Senate, just
a 1/8 chance of legislative change was originally assigned, which aligned the proportion of
Republican with senators who either co-sponsored the RFS Kill-Bill (Heller, Lee, and Barrasso),
plus those who have outright proposed legislative action to waive the ethanol mandate (Toomey,
Cruz, Hatch, Enzi, and Boozman.). This was amended to a 50% chance following the recent
introduction of a bill by Congressmen John Shimkus and Bill Flores; the logic here was to
include not only the Republican Senators who voted against the ethanol mandate, but also those
who are definitive yes votes but deemed as potentially liable to compromise on ethanol in favor
of robust mandates for other fuels. The Shimkus-Flores bill indicates that even those who
support the RFS in its current form will want to move to institute reform, which amounts to
roughly 50% of the Republican Senators analyzed (those who could be seen as passionate about
writing a third version of the Renewable Fuel Standard).
As mentioned above, Electoral College fundamentals require a heightened level of
political support for ethanol-producing states. The Republican Party is likely unwilling to risk the
support of the four key states that flipped the White House for now-President Donald Trump and
17 Senators within the party are seen as decidedly Pro-RFS. This split between 17 Senators being
clearly Pro-RFS and 8 being entirely against the program underpins the assumption that a
Republican Congress would create the most uncertainty about the future of the program.
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No Legislative Change
The resulting tally suggests a 40% likelihood of the “No Legislative Change Scenario;”
here, the Renewable Fuel Standard rests in the power of the EPA Administrator. The
Administrator is mandated by the original policy language to consult the history of the program’s
success in achieving policy goals when determining Renewable Volume Obligations. To the
extent that the Administrator’s analysis mirrors the one above, there should be no downward
change to biomass-based diesel blending obligations. At a minimum, biomass-based diesel’s
mandated blending must exceed 1 billion gallons annually due to a specific requirement in the
“All Other Calendar Years” section of the EISA of 2007. In the future, ethanol’s ability to
qualify for total renewable fuels is capped at 15 billion gallons a year xli, as well. Beyond this, the
market will have to look at “reset” discussions and annual rulemakings to get a feel for any
evolution of the advanced cellulosic portion of the RFS. The bottom line remains clear that the
most likely scenario for RFS in 2023 in this scenario is a near-mirror image of the program in
2018. This fact contradicts the echoing pains of political uncertainty I unearthed in many of my
conversations with those involved with the industry. Short-term noise in Washington does not
translate to structural change in a policy program overnight.
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The Renewable Future Standard’s Future in a Republican Congress
In the 80% chance that Republicans control Congress, a small likelihood of changing the
Renewable Fuel Standard was originally assigned. Now, after a recent draft discussion bill
released by two Republican Congressmen that would replace the ethanol mandate with a national
octane specification and tie annual biomass-based diesel mandates to actual annual production, a
50% probability is assigned. This remains the single most uncertain future scenario for the
program and it would increase volatility in RIN markets as the party has two groups with
competing thoughts on what the future of the Renewable Fuel Standard should be. At the risk of
simplification, the divide is between those from agriculture-producing states versus those from
either refining states or those who adhere strictly to laissez-faire ideology. As Senator Chuck
Grassley of Iowa chairs the powerful Judiciary Committee and happens to be perhaps the most
vocal advocate of the Renewable Fuel Standard, he could wield outsized influence over the
party. At the same time, 32 different Republican Senators appear to be outright “No” votes for
any future RFS proposal that holds elements similar to the one passed in the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007. This underpins the uncertainty that such a set-up would
pose if the Senate grows uneasy with the program being in the hands of the Executive Branch in
2023, a possibility repeatedly brought up in my questioning of industry participants.
With a Republican Congress and President, the idea of a compromise between the
agriculture and oil lobbies was also a talking point in my conversations with industry participants
at the American Fats and Oils Association’s annual meeting. This compromise, some believe,
would take the view of maintaining the ethanol mandate and phasing out biomass-based diesel
and advanced cellulosic fuels. As mentioned above, this is viewed as having a near-zero percent
chance of occurring due to the prevalence of soy acreage in the nation’s farming mix. It would be
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political suicide for Senators from soy producing states to openly abandon their soy farmers after
these farmers have already been caught in tariffs associated with the U.S.-China Trade War.
Getting rid of the biomass-based diesel mandate in favor of keeping the corn ethanol mandate
would be a redundant way of hurting soy farmers while awarding corn farmers because ethanol
would likely be blended into gasoline even without the mandate due to its value as an octane
enhancer.
The Future of RFS in a Democratic Congress
The views of the Democratic Party towards the Renewable Fuel Standard are much more
uniform: use it to advance environmental goals. The Senators in the Democratic Party who have
voiced hostility to the RFS have done so almost exclusively to the ethanol portion, with Senator
Cardin of Maryland mentioning that “Maryland’s large poultry industry has concerns with the
RFS and how the diversion of 40% of our annual domestic corn crop is being turned into fuel.”
The resoundingly negative associations with ethanol production from land use change and
questionability around the accounting for its lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions could put the
fuel at risk in a Democratic Congress as multiple Congressman have voiced hostility to the
ethanol mandate’s environmental consequences xlii. As such, it appears that the proposed, ideal
scenario for RFS reform has the best chance of having its core elements (namely, limiting
ethanol growth and properly incentivizing next generation renewable fuel) adopted in a
Democratic Congress. The odds of this scenario occurring are just 20%, however; adding this
20% onto the 40% chance of no major legislative change creates a bright future for biomassbased diesel and renewable diesel. This conclusion is at odds with the conventional wisdom I
encountered at the conference that spoke of the high potential for cuts to biodiesel.
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Overall, it looks like Renewable Fuels producers, farmers, feedstock aggregators, and
everyone else in the industry will have to accept that certainty exists for the biomass-based diesel
mandate, but the form the mandate will take remains uncertain. As developments in the
ideological composition of Congress unfold, the Renewable Fuel Standard Senate tracking tool
included in this report’s Appendix can be quickly adjusted to reflect any change in the
probabilistic model of the program’s future.

The Ideal Spot for a Renewable Fuel Producer: Close to California, Close to
Feedstocks
This analysis led to one last question: given the current structure of Congress and the
Renewable Fuel Standard, where should a producer of biodiesel from used cooking oil, for
example, locate within the United States? The robustness of California’s Low Carbon Fuel
Standard coupled with the state’s Cap and Trade program make it a strong home for renewable
fuels. Illinois was also considered as the ultimate home for such a production facility as
“Through December 31, 2023, sales and use taxes do not apply to the proceeds from the sale of
biodiesel blends containing between 11% and 99% biodiesel (B11-B99) or fuels containing
between 70% and 90% ethanol (E70-E90).” xliii It was California that was selected as the ideal
location, however, as the LCFS program rewards producers based on the specific Carbon
Intensity of the feedstock which incentivizes lower CI Feeds such as used cooking oil. Oregon
and Washington were dually considered but the longevity of the California LCFS made it less
succumbed to political uncertainty. The recent increase in LCFS Credit prices (shown below) as
the state strives to meet increasingly aggressive emissions reductions targets heightens the

42

potential of a low carbon intensity feed such as used cooking oil xliv. Since producers are awarded
based on the lower CI value of used cooking oil, California’s market makes it a valuable feed.
Demand concerns also led to analyzing specifically California as opposed to Illinois as
REG
already
“[sells]

approximately 101 million gallons of biomass-based diesel in the state [of Illinois].” xlv Adding to
this concern was the state’s production profile: “The state is a leading producer of both ethanol
and biodiesel, with the third-largest production capacity in the nation for ethanol and fourth for
biodiesel.” xlvi It seemed more worthwhile, then, to examine the economics of selling biodiesel
from used cooking oil into the California market. Industry participants suggested that doing
business in the state of California can be both costly and litigious, which led to considering
nearby states as alternatives; locating a facility close to the feedstock to minimize transportation
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costs is a lesson gleaned from the ethanol industry, which locates nearly all of its plants close to
corn production, shown below.
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In this process, Nevada jumped out as a state with high potential. Las Vegas,
specifically, has the feedstock (used cooking oil) nearby and the rail connectivity needed to
service the California market, as shown below. If feed price differentials in Nevada against
California and state incentives from the Nevada government outweigh the rail cost, locating the
facility in the Las Vegas area demonstrates a higher NPV over nine years than a similar
California facility, all else equal. Relative values are used in the NPV calculation as neither feed

prices nor exact rail prices could be obtained on campus. The tool allows for the simplistic
insertion of data obtained from price quotes so industry participants can quickly tweak the model
to make sure the model’s assumptions match their business’s reality.
To determine this, all of the variable costs are modeled in a DCF model that allows a user
to select a state from a drop-down list, which leads to costs automatically adjusting accordingly.
Certain costs, like rail and state-specific incentives are not possible to model specifically without
quotes. Here, assumptions are made for differentials between California and Nevada on a
percentage basis. This allows for the conclusion that the difference in feedstock costs added onto
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state tax incentives must outweigh the rail cost of sending the feedstock into California.
Otherwise, the decline in NPV of doing business in Nevada as brought on by the rail leg must be
viewed as compensated for by avoiding the qualitative costs of building a production plant in
California (long lead times, highly litigious, etc.).

The tool, illustrated above, concludes that a combination of state tax incentives and
qualitative gains of not locating in California must equal roughly ~34 cents per gallon to
compensate for the added rail cost and maintain the same NPV of the project in Nevada as
in California. Obtaining such a favorable tax package should not be ruled out given that Nevada
provided Tesla with $1.3 billion in tax incentives and other benefits to locate its gigafactory
within the state xlvii.
Nevada should be considered as a top destination for Renewable Fuels due to Las
Vegas’s abundance of used cooking oil, proximity to sell into the robust California market,
appropriate rail connectivity, plus the state’s potential ability to offer a unique set of tax
incentives to a biodiesel producer. Although no publicly available data for feedstock costs by
region could be obtained, it seems likely that Las Vegas’s used cooking oil could be on sale
relative to California’s used cooking oil due to the fact that “Cities with the most fast food
restaurants per capita… were spread more evenly throughout the country with Orlando,
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Cincinnati, and Las Vegas in the top three spots.” xlviii The current geography of biodiesel plants,
shown below, also suggests that any used cooking oil from Las Vegas might be leaving the state
to other facilities anyhow. This places a producer located closer to the in-state feeds at a
competitive advantage. The second leg of transportation would still have to be on rail, but this
criteria is satisfied by the fact that Las Vegas falls on the Union Pacific line into California.

Figure 3 Created using NREL's Biodiesel Atlas

Concluding Thoughts on the Future
Analyzing the composition of the Senate and each Senator’s view of the Renewable
Future Standard revealed just how fractured the politics around RFS really are. Splits within the
Republican Party decrease the ability to forecast the program’s future with any certainty, yet one
parallel exists outside of the major corn producing states: hostility to ethanol. Republican
Senators with no in-state economic incentive to support the ethanol mandate and those with an
incentive to vehemently oppose it, such as Texas Senator Ted Cruz, tend to hold a principled
view against the Renewable Fuel Standard’s ethanol mandate. With some Republican Senators
47

making the ethanol mandate the whipping boy of their laissez faire rhetoric and a growing
environmental concern among Democrats, it is ethanol – not biodiesel – that should be nervous
for what it is to come in future policy changes. In fact, this is exactly what happened shortly after
I finalized an early draft of this report. The draft discussion bill recently introduced by
Congressmen Shimkus and Flores aims to “sunset the conventional biofuel pool under the RFS
as of 2023” xlix while simultaneously introducing a new RVO setting process that could lead to
increased growth in biodiesel production.
Those bemoaning Renewable Fuel Standard uncertainty have a reason to be exhausted.
The drama over small refinery exemptions and E15 sent conflicting signals to a market aching
for leadership out of Washington. Is this administration pro-refiners? Pro-ag? What will happen
in 2023? These are necessary questions for market participants to ask. But they should not be
questions that call for a complete sunset of the Renewable Fuel Standard. Perpetual uncertainty,
though exhausting, is a fundamental reality of any legislation that seeks to satisfy a handful of
bold policy goals by involving competing parties and technological advancement. In fact, by
writing in future growth in advanced cellulosic fuels, the program itself was betting on a wide
range of uncertainties. This uncertainty also creates opportunities for companies that invest in
understanding the political landscape and specifics of the policy. While nobody at the conference
I attended spoke about the removal of ethanol mandates in the future as the probable outcome,
my analysis suggests that it can and should happen. Getting caught in the noise can lead to
exhaustion whereas analyzing the facts can lead to profit.
The reality of uncertainty does not mean industry participants should entirely ignore all
“noise” from the nation’s capital. Understanding which direction policymakers intend to take the
Renewable Fuel Standard should underscore the going concern operations of any legitimate
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business operating in the renewable fuels industry. When the uncertainty at the Federal level
becomes too much to consider a large-scale capital expenditure in the renewable fuels industry,
state level legislation can be used as a hedge. The robustness and duration of California’s Low
Carbon Fuel Standard make its renewable fuels market the ideal home for a producer looking to
elude political uncertainty, or at least hedge political risk. For industry participants looking to
avoid locating their primary activities in California, the Las Vegas area was shown to be an
economical alternative.
Whether it be through California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard, recent moves in Congress
to protect biodiesel, or the understanding provided by analyzing the specific policy language,
biodiesel’s future in the United States is a bright one. Dim forecasts of doom after 2022 were
found to be rooted solely in psychological, not political, elements. There are not enough votes in
the Senate to sunset the Renewable Fuel Standard; ethanol has a home in gasoline regardless of
the Renewable Fuel Standard; and, perhaps most importantly, the environmental goals of the
Renewable Fuel Standard are found to have missed their mark by a wide margin. These facts
suggest that biodiesel will be well-accounted for in any future of the Renewable Fuel Standard.
Around the beginning of forming my thesis question of “What will happen to the Renewable
Fuel Standard after 2022?” the industry participants I spoke with asked questions like “will the
biodiesel mandate exist beyond 2022?” Based on my analysis, the question is no longer an
existential one, but a quantity one: “to what extent will the biodiesel mandate exist” replaces
“will it exist?”
Analyzing the policy’s goals suggests that a weaker version of the biodiesel mandate is
far less probable than a stronger version, a welcomed outcome for anyone involved in the
biodiesel industry. We can expect the Renewable Fuel Standard to continue in perpetuity, based

49

on the policy language, and reasonably expect an upward revision to biodiesel and advanced
biofuels in a left-leaning Congress. In a right-leaning Congress, there are too many competing
views within the Republican Party to conclude what such a Congress would do to the Renewable
Fuel Standard. In both Congressional scenarios, the ethanol mandate is greatly at risk, but
biodiesel and advanced biofuels are very likely to maintain their support. Keeping an eye on the
dynamic Senate tracking model will be crucial to understand changes in the likely future of the
Renewable Fuel Standard.
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